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Abstract
This study examines the potential for intra-Africa trade and the prospects of advancing regional economic
integration through such trade. A variety of empirical models are deployed for the purpose. The analysis and
model simulation results reveal the existence of signiﬁcant potential for intra-Africa trade. However, realizing
this potential and hence the effort to advance regional integration through intra-Africa trade is challenged by lack
of complementarities of exports and imports as well as the relative competitive position of African potential
export suppliers. This is the result of weak infrastructure, productivity and trade facilitation — in short, acute
export supply constraint that characterizes the African export trade. This calls for an innovative approach to
enhance intra-Africa trade and furthering regional integration. Addressing the challenge of export supply
constraint, export competitiveness and diversiﬁcation is found to be crucial. This in turn calls for policies that
need to go beyond liberalization to actual realization of the potential for trade through provision of regional
(multi-country) and domestic infrastructures, harmonizing macroeconomic policies, enhancing trade enabling
institutions, developing trade facilitation as well as regionally focused diversiﬁcation plan using the existing
regional economic communities (RECs) as vehicles.
© 2015 Afreximbank. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
For the last sixty years, following independence in the 1960s, Africa has seen a number of regional
economic communities (RECs) that are mainly motivated by political groupings. Today an African⁎ Corresponding author.
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20 A. Geda, E.H. Seid / Journal of African Trade 2 (2015) 19–50country is a member of at least one economic grouping (Diagram 1). This proliferation of RECs partly
indicates that the issue of regional integration is very crucial for African countries.1 This is not
surprising given that about 35% of the population and one-third of the economies in the continent are
trapped as landlocked countries whose trade and development depend on what happens in their
coastal neighbors. In addition, most countries in Africa are small in size and hence their economic
feasibility and global bargaining position individually are highly limited. These, inter alia, are
powerful motivations for regional integration. The achievement in terms of regional integration in the
continent to date, however, is modest.
One of the most important instruments that are believed to bring about advances in regional
integration in the continent is a sustained growth in intra-Africa trade. However, the performance to
date is very modest. This poor performance casts doubt, even with the existence of any potential for
intra-Africa trade. Thus, it is imperative to investigate both the existence of a potential for intra-Africa
trade as well as the constraints for its realization. With this objective, the rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2, after a brief background about regional integration efforts in the continent, will
attempt to show the major findings of other studies on the issue (Section 2.2). The section will then
provide new evidence about intra-Africa trade potential found in the context of this study. This is
done using both gravity models (Section 2.3) as well as trade similarity and revealed comparative
advantage indices (Section 2.4). Section 3 will focus on examining the challenges for realizing the
identified potential. Section 4 by offering the policy implications of the study concludes the paper.
2. The literature: is there a potential for intra-Africa trade?
2.1. A brief background about regional integration & RECs in Africa
The current pattern of RECs shows the existence of a number of regional economic communities
(Diagram 1) whose missions overlap, and for the most part, are yet to achieve the most important
objectives they were set up to accomplish — enhancing economic integration and improving the
living standard of their population. One major instrument in this regard is intra-Africa trade. Although
the African share of world trade is less than 2%, that little trade constitutes more than half the GDP of
each African country. Thus, intra-Africa trade has the potential to raise the level of welfare of the
African population through fostering regional economic development (Longo and Sekkat, 2001; Geda
and Kibret, 2008).
RECs do have the potential to contribute to the growth of intra-Africa trade, could enhance
Africa's bargaining power in trade negotiations, and help ensure more policy credibility. The welfare
effect, if managed carefully, is unequivocally positive. Regionalism coupled with good policies
(sound macroeconomic management, lower political tensions, and better physical infrastructure)
could, hence, lead to welfare gains. In sum, on top of the pure economic arguments for African RECs,
their interplay with politics and policies may turn integration into an efficient solution to intra-Africa
trade and related developmental endeavors (Longo and Sekkat, 2001; Geda and Kibret, 2008).
According to World Bank (2000), however, contrary to the above optimism, South–South trade
through these RECs was found to be quite problematic. On theoretical ground, Venables (1999)1 These include the West African Economic Community (CEAO), Community for East and Southern African states
(COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), the Central African Customs and Economic Union (EDEAC), the African and Malagasy Common Organization
(OCAM), the Comite Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
(CEPGL), East African Economic Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and one may add
the South African Customs Union (SACU).
Diagram 1. Overlapping membership in African RECs.
Source: Adopted from Oshikoya (2010) which is based on UNCTAD secretariat.
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22 A. Geda, E.H. Seid / Journal of African Trade 2 (2015) 19–50argues that South–South regional integration schemes are likely to lead to income divergence
between member countries. This does not, however, override the theoretical welfare gain of such
schemes as established by the theoretical works of Kemp and Wan (1987), and Kemp (1964).
Compared to the continent's trade with the outside world, formal intra-Africa trade has remained at
a very low level, constituting not more than 10% of total annual trade of each REC on average in
2013. The only exception is the EAC that trades about 20% internally (Oramah and Abou-Lehaf,
1998; Geda and Kibret, 2008; Table 1 below). The level of intra-Africa export as percent of GDP is
also very low being only 2.2% of the continent's GDP in the year 2004. This has hardily increased,
being only 2.5% in 2010 (Geda, 2013). Despite the proliferation of regional economic communities in
the continent, Africa has been primarily trading with the outside world since the turn of the 20th
century. The pattern of African exports continues to be strongly influenced by the continent's
historical links with the outside world (Geda, 2002). Over 80% of exports are still destined for
markets outside Africa, with the European Union and the United States of America accounting for
over 50% of this total. The last decade witnessed a shift from these traditional partners to the
emerging economies of China, India and Brazil, among others (Geda, 2013).2.2. The literature
Given the unsatisfactory performance of the African RECs in promoting intra-regional trade to
date, questions such as ‘is there a potential for intra-Africa trade, after all?’ and ‘what are the major
constraints to intra-Africa trade?’ are timely and important. The potential for intra-Africa trade and the
role of RECs in that process is a contested issue. It is argued in the literature that in spite of the
proliferation of RECs, the continent has not shown success in expanding intra-regional trade; and
most of these regional economic communities have achieved very little (Ndulo, 1992; Foroutan and
Pritchett, 1993; Geda and Kibret, 2008).Table 1
African RECs and intra-regional trade (% of RECs total exports).
Source: UNCTADstat, accessed in April 2015.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CEMAC 1.39 1.40 2.81 1.89 2.46 2.69 1.95 2.19 1.93
CENSAD 6.47 6.03 5.92 6.66 7.51 6.73 6.04 6.61 7.78
COMESA 5.12 5.08 4.79 5.42 7.10 7.38 9.47 8.08 9.42
EAC 18.53 15.51 17.74 18.85 18.79 18.59 19.68 20.68 19.52
ECCAS 0.88 0.89 1.67 0.99 1.56 1.77 1.01 1.10 1.05
ECOWAS 9.64 8.40 8.44 9.59 9.74 8.29 6.33 7.83 9.32
IGAD 9.83 9.08 7.84 7.72 8.67 9.20 11.83 14.10 12.64
SADC 9.73 9.79 10.47 10.81 12.25 12.61 10.77 13.25 16.79
UMA 1.92 1.99 2.10 2.50 2.89 2.43 2.70 2.69 3.68
WAEMU 14.09 13.83 14.82 14.81 12.56 12.98 10.78 13.77 14.73
Note: CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States;
CEPGL: Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries; COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa;
EAC: East African Community; ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS: Economic Community
of West African States; IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development; MRU: Mano River Union; SACU: Southern
African Customs Union; SADC: Southern African Development Community; UMA: Arab Maghreb Union; WAEMU: West
African Economic and Monetary Union.
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performance of regional economic communities in Africa using the popular gravity model. Though
the results of these studies slightly vary, the general findings and conclusions are similar. According
to these studies the experience of regional integration in Africa has been disappointing in achieving
one of its main objectives of increasing intra-regional trade and fostering policy coordination (Geda
and Kibret, 2008; Longo and Sekkat, 2001; Yeats, 1999; OECD, 1993; Foroutan and Pritchett, 1993;
Elbadawi, 1997; Lyakurwa et al., 1997; World Bank, 1991). Notwithstanding some positive
developments in some of the African RECs, the weak intra-regional trade and the lack of progress
over time — despite the multitude of treaties to that effect — do warrant further exploration. Should
the weak performance of regional integration in Africa be attributed solely to a lack of
implementation? Or should it be attributed to some attendant characteristics of African economies,
which led Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) to conclude that even in the absence of trade restrictions, the
scope for trade among African countries is ‘intrinsically’ modest (Geda and Kibret, 2008)?
According to UNCTAD (2005), intra-regional trade in UMA, for instance, is particularly low,
despite the relatively diversified manufactured exports of some of its members (e.g.; Morocco and
Tunisia). In 2005, Western Europe accounted for two thirds of total UMA exports: not only that most
of the fuel exports (mainly from Algeria and Libya) went to that market, but also 80% of the
manufactures exported by Morocco and Tunisia followed suit (UNCTAD, 2005).
Cassim's (2001) empirical examination about the determinants of intra-regional trade in Southern
African countries shows that intra-regional trade in SADC is not low by international standards. In fact the
region's trade is actually beyond its potential, as actual trade is much higher than the regional trade
expected. When compared to regions such as the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the actual
South African exports to the region, for instance, are higher than the estimated potential exports. However,
the model indicates low trade volumes for other, especially non-SACU countries in the SADC region,
indicating the existence of a scope for increased exports from non-SACU countries to South Africa.
In an earlier study Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) compared actual trade with what a traditional
gravity model would predict. Employing the model for 19 Sub-Saharan countries, Foroutan and
Pritchett (1993) predicted the level of intra-Africa trade that should occur based on their proximity to
each other, the relative size of their economies and other economic characteristics. According to this
study, the actual Sub-Saharan African share of imports plus exports was an average (median) of 8.1%
(4.5%) while the gravity model predicts a slightly lower, not higher, mean (median) of 7.5% (4.5%)
implying that the actual intra-Africa trade is higher than expected.
The studies noted above are usually based on officially recorded trade data and fail to capture
significant unrecorded intra-Africa trade that is common across the continent — usually referred as
informal cross-border trade (ICBT). A recent comprehensive study on Uganda is quite informative
about the magnitude and nature of such trade across the continent. The meticulous study shows that
the ICBT in Uganda was about US$800 in 2009. This has dramatically declined to about US$528 in
2010 (UBOS, BOU, 2011). The 2009 ICBT figure is about 51% of the formal official export of
Uganda. Even the 2010 figure is about 33% of the formal export of Uganda. Similar studies about
ICBT across the continent show the significant level and effect of such trade (see, inter alia, USAID,
2013; Minde and Nakhumwa, 1998; Macamo, 1999).
This mixed finding in literature leads to two important questions: first, is there a potential for
intra-Africa trade after all? And second, if there is, what are the major constraints that held African
countries from exploiting this potential? If there is none, what are the reasons? This is the gap in the
literature this study attempts to address. The study re-examined the issue using recent and panel data
(1993–2010), new techniques of estimation and analysis as well as wider coverage of African
countries. This new result is reported in the next sub-section.
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The specification of the gravity model used in this study, the expected signs of the regressors,
country coverage and the data used for estimation are described in Appendix A. The estimated
coefficients of the gravity model are used to simulate the potential for intra-Africa trade. This exercise
is done for two groups of countries. One of the groups is a region where the level of integration is at
advanced level that included a common currency (West & Central Africa). The second group contains
the rest of the continent (North, East & Southern Africa) — almost all countries are members of the
COMESA. This result is reported below.2.3.1. West and Central Africa
The gravity model specified in Appendix A is estimated for West and Central African countries as
reporting countries and the rest of Africa as trading partner using the Pseudo Poisson Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) technique that tackles the problems associated with OLS estimation (Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006). In addition, an alternative panel-Tobit based estimation is also made, both for
completeness and as a robustness check of the results. The sample covers all countries if the required
data is available (see Appendix A for country samples used). The result of this estimation is given in
Table 2a.
The result shows that most of the traditional gravity model variables have the expected signs. They
are also statistically significant.2 In addition, the remoteness index which is a proxy for multilateral
resistance term (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Rose, 2000; Rose
and van Wincoop, 2001; Eicher and Henn, 2009) is found to be an important determinant of bilateral
trade. The difference in per capita income between West African countries and their trading partners,
a proxy that shows difference in preference or what is called ‘the Linder effect’, is found to affect
bilateral trade negatively, as expected.
Having this result, a simulation exercise is conducted to examine the potential or theoretical level
of intra-Africa trade for each West African country, given the parameters of the model as reported in
Table 2a. This is then compared with actual trade of each country (as the ratio of that country's total
trade with all its major trading partners, both in West Africa and the rest of the world). The result of
this exercise is given in Table 2b.
The result, as can be read from the last column of Table 2b, shows that for all countries in the
region (except for Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, where the model
underestimated their level of trade) their actual trade is significantly below the potential given by
the gravity model. This result varies across countries, however. Whereas some countries' actual trade
levels are near their potential (90% for Gabon), the majority are found to have a level of actual trade
significantly below their potential. If the three countries are excluded, on the average, the actual trade
is only 18% of the potential (or just 16% using the median value).2.3.2. North, East and Southern Africa
A similar gravity model to that of Table 2a is also estimated for North, East & Southern African
countries as a group. The result is given in Table 3a.2 Model speciﬁcation with a number of regressors may suffer from over-parameterization and multicollinearity. The
correlation matrix offered in appendix III shows that our model doesn't suffer from these problems. As appendix III shows the
only high correlation found is the one between GDP and the remoteness/areas indicators. This is because the latter is weighted
by GDP. We re-estimated the model by excluding one of the variables. This didn't change the result. We are grateful to one of
the referees of the journal for pointing this out.
Table 2a
Estimated results of the model for West and Central Africa (1993–2010).
Estimation technique PPML Tobit
Dependent variables Exports, Xijt (Mln) Ln(export + 1)
Ln(GDP)_reporter 0.378 ⁎⁎⁎ 2.792 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0413) (0.408)
Ln(GDP)_partner 0.470 ⁎⁎⁎ 3.237 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0393) (0.4)
Landlocked (dummy)_partner −0.582 ⁎⁎⁎ −3.245 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.208) (0.756)
Landlocked (dummy)_reporter −1.579 ⁎⁎⁎ −5.382 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.236) (0.865)
Sharing common border 1.612 ⁎⁎⁎ 3.872 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.288) (1.106)
Having the same official language 0.804 ⁎⁎⁎ 1.2
(0.193) (0.799)
Sharing common colonizer 1.001 ⁎⁎⁎ 6.951 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.212) (0.833)
Ln(per capita GDP diff) −0.0431 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.0883
(0.00363) (0.0819)
Ln(population size)_r 1.185 ⁎⁎⁎ 1.019 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0608) (0.364)
Ln(population size)_p 1.118 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.965 ⁎⁎⁎
−(0.0601) (0.363)
Ln(area in km2)_p −0.823 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.866 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0557) (0.241)
Ln(area in km2)_r −0.538 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.21
(0.0867) (0.33)
Bilateral exchange rate (of p & r) −0.0477 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.392 ⁎⁎
(0.00838) (0.191)
Ln(remoteness)_P a 0.336 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.683 ⁎⁎
(0.0183) (0.316)
Ln(remoteness)_R a 0.521 ⁎⁎⁎ −1.181 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0199) (0.306)
Ln(distance between r and p) −1.585 ⁎⁎⁎ −5.047 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.132) (0.432)
Constant −28.80 ⁎⁎⁎ −111.0 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0495) (8.368)
Number of observations 15,087 15,087
Note: Ln refers to natural logarithm of the variable; _r refers to reporting country; _p partner country.
a Remoteness index shows “the multilateral resistance” the two partner countries face while trading. The lower this resistance
(i.e. the higher the value of this index) is, the larger the two countries in question will trade.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎ p b 0.1.
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also statistically significant in both estimation techniques (except the common official language
dummy which implausibly has a negative sign, though is not statistically significant and hence not
important). In addition, the multilateral trade resistance proxy is found to have a statistically
significant positive effect on bilateral trade in the region. The difference in per capita income is found
to have a statistically significant negative coefficient, suggesting the existence of the ‘Linder effect’.
Table 2b
The potential for intra-Africa trade in West and Central Africa (1993–2010).
Source: Own computation based on the gravity model.
Countries Actual trade (A) Model estimation (B) Potential (%) (A / B) ∗ 100
Benin 1317.3 542,292.0 0.2
Burkina Faso 1501.3 6388.8 23.5
Cameroon 4946.5 173,832.0 2.9
Cape Verde 15.5 105.0 14.7
Central African Republic 235.9 153.1 154.1
Chad 190.2 1118.7 17.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 3624.6 613,015.0 0.6
Congo, Rep. 1063.3 280,453.0 0.4
Cote d'Ivoire 30,869.5 78,699.5 39.2
Equatorial Guinea 450.6 1867.5 24.1
Gabon 2364.5 2612.0 90.5
Gambia, The 77.7 1653.4 4.7
Ghana 4046.5 482,424.0 0.8
Guinea 772.5 14,096.3 5.5
Guinea-Bissau 265.1 231.6 114.5
Liberia 944.9 508.2 185.9
Mali 393.3 2203.5 17.9
Niger 1581.1 2825.2 56.0
Nigeria 53,988.1 2,955,915.0 1.8
Senegal 7807.9 20,234.1 38.6
Sierra Leone 104.1 3439.7 3.0
Togo 3307.1 49,769.4 6.6
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countries incur a higher logistic cost to accesses the sea which adversely affects their competitiveness
and hence their level of exports and import bills.
Having the result in Table 3a, we have conducted similar simulation exercise to that of Table 2b.
The result is given in Table 3b. Table 3b shows that, except for Djibouti which is heavily trading with
Ethiopia; and Madagascar which is heavily trading with Mauritius, South Africa and Mozambique,
for the rest of the countries in the region their actual trade is significantly below the potential.
Excluding the three countries, on average, actual trade in the region is only 10% of the potential (or
mere 3% using the median value). This is half the level we found for West and Central African
countries in Table 2b.
In sum, the result from the simulation exercises in this sub-section shows the existence of
significant potential for intra-Africa trade. This potential is found to vary both across countries and
regions.3 Although the exercise suggests a great potential for intra-Africa trade, this does not mean
that this potential could easily be realized. What the models suggest is that, given the geographic
proximity, cultural affinity as well as the size of the economies, the level of intra-Africa trade could
have been larger than what it is now. However, since the model is based on proxy variables noted
above and uses aggregate value of exports, it fails to capture the structure of supply of exports and the3 Apparently the relatively high level of integration in West and Central Africa regions seems to be associated with higher
intra-Africa trade, compared to North, East and Southern African countries where the level of integration is modest.
Table 3a
The potential for intra-Africa trade: North, East & Southern Africa (1993–2010).
Estimation technique PPML Tobit
Variables Exports, Xijt (Mln) Ln(expo + 1)
Ln(GDP)_reporter 1.372 ⁎⁎⁎ 4.244 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0332) (0.403)
Ln(GDP)_partner 0.611 ⁎⁎⁎ 3.461 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0331) (0.375)
Landlocked_partner −1.917 ⁎⁎⁎ −1.991 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.278) (0.735)
Landlocked_reporter −1.072 ⁎⁎⁎ −1.078
(0.241) (0.772)
Sharing common border 0.753 ⁎⁎ 4.082 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.353) (1.102)
Sharing common language −0.382 −0.484
(0.221) (0.734)
Sharing common colonizer 0.712 ⁎⁎⁎ 6.334 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.197) (0.764)
Ln(per capita GDP difference) −0.00883 ⁎⁎ −0.296 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0035) (0.0803)
Ln(population size)_r 0.294 ⁎⁎⁎ 1.667 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0675) (0.352)
Ln(population size)_p 0.334 ⁎⁎⁎ 1.007 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0642) (0.355)
Ln(area in km2)_p −0.271 ⁎⁎⁎ −1.303 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0617) (0.228)
Ln(area in km2)_r −0.402 ⁎⁎⁎ −1.658 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0688) (0.218)
Bilateral exchange rate (between r & p) 0.0608 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.19
(0.0061) (0.15)
Ln(remoteness)_p 0.281 ⁎⁎⁎ −0.41
(0.0155) (0.297)
Ln(remoteness)_r 0.588 ⁎⁎⁎ −2.059 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.0162) (0.301)
Ln(distance in km b/n r & p) −2.378 ⁎⁎⁎ −4.762 ⁎⁎⁎
(0.166) (0.462)
Constant −27.78 ⁎⁎⁎ −128.1 ⁎⁎⁎
(1.805) (8.226)
Number of observations 15,055 15,055
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎ p b 0.1.
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sufficient condition, for enhancing intra-Africa trade. The sufficient condition for this trade to hold is
that what is supplied by one of the African countries, is specified by commodity category, and needs
to be demanded by the trading African partner country. This requires examining the pattern of
demand and supply by commodity category. Moreover, even if one finds complementarities between
these trading partners, it is imperative to examine the comparative advantage of the potentially
exporting African countries in replacing the current trading partners of the importing African
countries. These issues are discussed in the next section.
Table 3b
Actual and potential trade in North, East and Southern Africa: Model simulation results.
Source: Own computation based on the gravity model.
Countries Actual trade (A) Model estimation (B) Potential (%) (A / B) × 100
Algeria 13,105.8 53,800,000.0 0.02
Angola 9047.2 954,240.3 1.0
Burundi 145.7 1237.3 11.8
Comoros 13.1 45.3 28.9
Djibouti 3150.5 196.8 1601.3
Egypt 15,578.8 2,288,807.0 0.7
Ethiopia 1493.9 36,121.1 4.1
Kenya 20,313.8 265,581.9 7.7
Libya 10,998.9 33,500,000.0 0.0
Madagascar 750.1 589.4 127.3
Malawi 2539.8 3657.2 69.5
Mauritania 2451.5 11,766.7 20.8
Mauritius 2729.8 102,204.1 2.7
Morocco 8205.5 10,200,000.0 0.1
Mozambique 4400.0 1699.7 258.9
Rwanda 679.4 28,207.2 2.4
Seychelles 261.8 9064.9 2.9
Somalia 163.5 – –
South Africa 90,547.0 10,600,000.0 0.9
Sudan 1665.9 49,204.8 3.4
Tanzania 3500.5 165,540.9 2.1
Tunisia 15,046.7 18,300,000.0 0.1
Uganda 4559.3 1,001,899.0 0.5
Zambia 10,359.0 23,983.8 43.2
Zimbabwe 11,433.3 – –
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Given the significant potential for intra-Africa trade that is identified in the previous section, this
section is devoted to an examination of the relative comparative advantage of African countries that
have the potential to replace the current suppliers/exporters to the continent. This is aimed at further
investigating the challenge of realizing the significant trade potential identified in the previous
section. This is done by examining the structure of demand for and supply of African exports in the
first part of this section. This will be followed by an examination of the global comparative advantage
position of the potential African exporters identified in this study in supplying/exporting to the rest of
the continent.
2.4.1. The structure of African exports and imports
Using disaggregated commodities from UNComtrade database, in this section, we have examined
the structure of demand for and supply of exports in Africa. This is done by computing trade
similarity indexes for all countries in the continent. Trade similarity (intensity) indices are generally
defined as the ratio of the “share of a given country's exports” to a partner country to “the share of the
partner's similar index” in the global imports of the commodity in question.
Using such indices for the Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1989–1995 Yeats (1999)
noted that the level of intra-Africa trade is not lower than what should be expected. Similarly, in an
earlier study, Oramah and Abou-Lehaf (1998) computed two different measures of import–export
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intra-Africa trade data. They have, then, estimated a gravity model that includes these indices as
explanatory variables to elicit the relevance of these variables in explaining actual intra-Africa trade.
They also computed a trade potential indicator (TPI) that shows the relative strength of each African
country in exporting to other African countries. The results of the study indicate that the potential for
improving intra-Africa trade is rather modest, with only a few countries having export structures
strongly matching the import demands of other African countries.
When these measures of absolute trade potential were weighted by economic size of trading
partners using the relationship obtained from estimated gravity equation, it was found that the
countries that would stand to gain most from greater efforts to advance intra-Africa trade were
Comoros, South Africa, Egypt, Sudan, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, Algeria and Cameroon. Those
which may not gain as much include Burundi, Namibia, Guinea and Ethiopia owing to the poor
correspondence of their exports to the imports of economically strong African economies. However,
the gains were found to be normally distributed without very large extremes (Oramah and
Abou-Lehaf, 1998).
This is a story using a limited sample and data compiled 15 years ago. It is also the only study
available. Updating the data to current period and expanding the coverage to all African countries
offers empirical evidence about the current state of potential intra-Africa trade using a similar
approach. The result of such an exercise is important to evaluate the feasibility of realizing the
significant intra-Africa trade potential identified in the previous section. For this purpose, the export–
import similarity index approach originally developed by Van Beers and Linneman (1988) and used
successfully for Africa by Oramah and Abou-Lehaf (1998) is employed for the analysis in this section
(see Appendix B for the methodology).
The import–export correspondence index, COS, value used in this study, varies between zero (no
correspondence between the export of country i and the import of country j) and one (perfect
similarity). COS is the cosine of the angle between the vectors of country i exports and the vectors of
country j imports in an n-dimensional commodity space. Using top five import and export
commodities of all African countries, for which data is available for the period 2004 to 2007, a COS
measure is computed. This index may be interpreted as a variable reflecting the expected intensity of
bilateral trade flows from exporting country i to importing country j. The similarity of exports and
imports of all class of commodities is, however, one of the determinants of trade intensity between
two countries. The term ‘intensity’ is used in Van Beers' and Linneman's (1988) interpretation to
indicate that the analysis abstracts from the economic size of trading partners are reflected in the total
volume or value of their exports and imports. The latter are seen as scale factors with which the
‘intensity’ has to be multiplied in order to arrive at observed or potential trade flow magnitudes.
Moreover, apart from the degree of similarity between exporting and importing country commodities,
other factors such as infrastructure, non-tariff barriers, political factors favoring or obstructing trade,
as well as relative competitive position of exports do determine the level of bilateral trade between a
pair of countries. Among all these factors, the role of the degree of similarity in trade structure is a
limited yet an important one. “Without any commodity correspondence no trade will take place, and
with perfect correspondence trade possibilities abound”, as Van Beers and Linneman (1988) noted.
Table 4 reports estimated trade a similarity profile of African countries using the export–import
similarity index, COS. A few points need to be noted concerning the estimation techniques used to
generate this result. First, in computing the similarity measures using aggregate data, aggregated
under the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) format, no information is required about
the individual elements of the trade matrix at the commodity class level. Only total exports of country
i in commodity class k and total imports of country j in commodity class k are needed to compute the
Table 4
Import–export similarity index for Africa using the Van Beers and Linnemann approach (COS measure)a.
Source: Own computation based on UNComtrade database of the year 2007.
Exporter ≥50% 45–50% 40–45% 35–40% b25%
South Africa Zimbabwe Nigeria Gabon Benin Eritrea
Kenya Swaziland Gambia Mozambique Lesotho
Botswana Burkina Faso Malawi Ghana Libya
Mauritania Rwanda Mauritius Serra Leone Comoros
Burundi Niger, Zambia Sao Tome Togo
Ethiopia Tanzania Senegal
Tunisia Sudan
Uganda
Nigeria Benin, Botswana, Tunisia CAR Zambia Lesotho
Burkina Faso, Cameroon Namibia Rwanda Libya
Burundi, Cape Verde Comoros
Cote d'Ivoire, Mali Eritrea
Gambia, Guinea, Gabon
Madagascar, Mozambique Ghana
Mauritania, Mauritius Sudan
Malawi, Morocco
Niger, Sao Tome
Senegal, Seychelles
Serra Leone, Swaziland
Uganda, Tanzania
Zimbabwe, Togo
Egypt Benin, Burkina Faso CAR
Cameroon, Burundi
Botswana, Cape Verde
Cote d'Ivoire , Mauritius
Gambia, Guinea
Madagascar, Mali
Mauritania, Sierra Leone
Mozambique, Morocco
Sao Tome, Senegal
Swaziland, South Africa
Togo, Tanzania
Algeria Benin, Burkina Faso CAR Rwanda Sudan
Botswana, Cameroon Namibia Zambia Lesotho
Burundi, Egypt Libya
Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia Ghana
Gambia, Guinea, Kenya Gabon
Madagascar, Mali, Malawi Comoros
Mauritania, Mauritius Eritrea
Mozambique, Morocco
Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome
Senegal, Seychelles
Sierra Leone, South Africa
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo
Tunisia, Uganda
Cape Verde, Zimbabwe
Cameroon Benin, Botswana CAR Algeria
Burkina Faso, Burundi Comoros
Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia Eritrea
Guinea, Madagascar, Mali Gabon
Malawi, Mauritius Ghana
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Table 4 (continued)
Exporter ≥50% 45–50% 40–45% 35–40% b25%
Morocco, South Africa Lesotho
Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia Libya
Nigeria, Cape Verde
Cape Verde Cameroon, Nigeria Algeria
Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa
aTo compute the import–export similarity index, we used the year 2007 data for most countries. For those countries that have
not reported to UN the 2007 data, the available recent data is used. Countries which do not have any report after the year 2000
(Somalia and Angola) are omitted.
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measures indicate a trade potential or expected intensity of trade between a pair of countries. Thus, a
non-zero value of COSij does not necessarily imply that in actual fact country i does export to country
j. Rather, the estimated export–import similarity measure can be interpreted as reflecting the expected
intensity of a bilateral trade flow from exporting country i to importing country j. Second, usually a
country with a COS measure equal to or greater than 0.4 would be considered to have a reasonably
matching import structure with the exporting country of reference in the literature (Van Beers and
Linneman, 1988; Oramah and Abou-Lehaf, 1998). With this note, Table 4 shows a summary of COS
index computed, using top five export and import commodities of each African country at three digit
SITC classification.
Table 4 shows that the exports of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Cameroon fit well with
the imports of most African countries. These countries are found to have the potential to supply
exports to the trading partners listed from column two to six, in order of importance. Notwithstanding
this potential, the actual pattern of trade shows neither the realization of this potential nor reciprocity
from the potential importing countries. This may relate to the existence of significant challenges and
lack of adequate incentive to engage in trade.
In Table 4 Algeria, Nigeria and Cameroon in particular have got a high value of import–export
similarity index with most African countries. This is related to the nature of their major export
commodity which constitutes mineral fuels, oils and related products. These are also major importable
commodities by almost all African countries. South Africa and Egypt, on the other hand, are capable
of exporting manufactured commodities that are demanded by the rest of Africa. Table 4 also shows
the existence of countries such as Benin, Ethiopia, Niger, and Zambia with export commodities
(cotton, edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons, coffee, tea and spices, oil seeds and
oleaginous fruits, copper) that have less or no demand at all in other African countries.
In general, the result shows that only few countries have the potential to supply/export
commodities that match the demand of the majority of countries in the continent. These are Egypt,
South Africa, Cameron, Nigeria, and Algeria— the latter three countries' importance being related to
their fuel exporting status. In addition, the composition of exports from these top suppliers is not well
diversified and, hence, limited in matching the demand from the majority of countries in Africa. Even
South Africa's top exports, for instance, are dominated by mineral and precious metals, followed by
Iron and steel and some manufactured goods. Similarly, Egypt's export is dominated by mineral fuels
with limited supply of manufactured goods. From this analysis it is not difficult to conclude that the
potential for intra-Africa trade, which seems very large using the gravity model, is very modest from
commodity composition perspective. The implication of this finding for policy relates to the
importance of a conscious region or continent wide strategy of diversification and competitiveness
aimed at enhancing intra-Africa trade.
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Although the discussion in the above sub-section points out the limited scope available to exploit
the potential for intra-Africa trade identified in Section 2.3, it has also shown that some African
countries have, at least, the theoretical potential to supply export to other countries in the continent. It
is not clear, however, whether these African countries are capable of competitively supplying to other
countries in the continent. The majority of countries in the continent are currently importing from
non-African suppliers such as the OECD countries and the emerging Asian economies such as China
with which the Africa-based suppliers need to compete with.
Earlier similar empirical studies for other developing countries were not encouraging. Van Beers
and Linneman (1988) used a wide range of data from developing (including Africa) and developed
countries (OECD countries) to examine this issue in the late 1980s. They found that none of the
Southern countries included in their sample are found to be competent enough to replace the
Northern exporters. Heavy reliance of developing countries on developed countries' exporters for the
supply of manufactured products is at the core of the whole issue of raising South–South trade. This
picture did not change fundamentally in the early 1990s either. A World Bank (1991) study, for
instance, argued that African countries have similar production and export profiles and therefore
have little or nothing to exchange. Other studies (Achy, 2006; Weeks and Subasat, 1998; Roelofsen,
1989; ECA, 1987), however, argued to the contrary. They pointed out that intra-Africa trade
potentials are enormous. For instance, the gravity model based study of Achy (2006) revealed that
compared to international trend the actual North African intra-regional trade is ten times lower than
its potential (Achy, 2006). Achy (2006), using trade complementary index, further noted that a
strong correlation exists between this trade complementarity index and the growth rate of
intra-regional trade in the region. Thus, these studies had sought further trade liberalization, and
speedier economic integration efforts to realize such trade potential. Examining the relative
competitive position of African suppliers with those currently supplying countries in the continent
could shed light on the challenge of realizing this potential. Such information is offered in Tables 5
and 6.
In Table 5, the relative value of the revealed comparative advantage indices of manufacture exports
of African countries identified to have the potential to supply other countries in the continent (South
Africa, Egypt, Cameroon, Nigeria, Algeria, and Kenya) is given. This is compared with the current
major African suppliers (Western Europe, USA, Japan, China and India). Other related indicators of
competitiveness of these two groups of suppliers are also given in Table 6.
The ‘revealed comparative advantage’ index used in Table 5 is based on Balassa's (1965)
approximation using post-trade data that manifests both post-trade relative prices and prevailing
factor and product market distortions. According to Balassa (1965, 1979) and Mahmood (2001)
comparative advantage is revealed in relatively high shares of export markets. However, to evaluate
what is low or high, Balassa (1965, 1979) called for these shares to be compared to some average.
Defined as such, the revealed comparative advantage index (RCAI) compares a country's world
export share of the commodity in question with the total world export share of the total exports of that
country. If a country's share of world export of a particular commodity is greater than the country's
share of world exports of all commodities, the RCAI will be greater than one — indicating that this
country has RCA in that product (Lutz, 1987; Rana, 1990; Dowling and Cheang 2000; Mahmood,
2001; Geda and Meskel, 2008). Formally, the RCA index could be given by (Kwan, 2002; Geda,
2012):
RCA ¼ Xi j=Xwj
Xi=Xw
Table 5
Revealed comparative advantage of potential African suppliers in manufactured goods.
Source: Own computation based on World Bank data.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Algeria 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cameroon 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.39 0.31 0.13 0.36 0.14 na
Egypt 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.32 0.40 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.53
Kenya 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.40 na na na
Nigeria na 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.07
South Africa 0.73 0.66 0.68 0.74 0.65 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.71
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.45
China 1.42 1.44 1.48 1.51 1.56 1.55 1.55 1.56 1.57
India 0.75 0.69 0.67 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.77 0.78 0.76
France 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.05 1.06 1.04
Germany 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.31 1.30 1.31 1.34 1.30 1.30
Italy 1.18 1.19 1.23 1.26 1.27 1.26 1.28 1.27 1.29
Japan 1.42 1.43 1.46 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.50 1.49 1.46
Korea 1.33 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.40 1.40 1.30 1.23 1.26
Netherlands 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.99 1.13 1.02 1.04
Sweden 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.90 0.89
UK 0.81 0.83 0.71 0.75 0.70 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.79
USA 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.80
OECD 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.02 1.02
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RCA N 1 implies having ‘revealed comparative advantage’.
Table 5 shows that African potential suppliers' RCA is less than half the level registered for OECD
countries as well as China and India. This would have been even less than 10% of the OECD and
emerging South's levels had it not been for Egypt's and South Africa's better performance. Thus,
within Africa, South Africa, followed by Egypt and Kenya, is relatively better in terms of RCA,Table 6
Relative comparative advantage of potential African suppliers (average, 2005–2013).
Source: Based on World Bank (2014), World Development Indicators.
Change in CPI ratio of
potential African suppliers
REER index of
potential African
suppliers
Export unit price ratios of
potential African suppliers
High tech exports (% of
Manu exports) a
With
OECD
With
China
With
India
With
OECD
With
China
With
OECD
With
China
With
India
Algeria 2.23 0.38 0.5 0.99 1.02 1.14 1.18 1.10 0.68
Cameroon 1.37 0.51 0.36 1.00 1.03 1.17 1.20 1.07 3.4
Egypt 5.05 1.11 1.20 na na 0.91 0.93 0.84 0.65
Kenya 5.12 2.22 1.51 na na 1.12 1.15 1.03 4.5
Nigeria 5.63 1.98 1.46 0.97 1.01 1.26 1.29 1.15 2.3
South
Africa
2.91 0.58 0.75 0.91 0.94 1.16 1.19 1.06 5.5
Note: For change in CPI ratio, we have taken Inflation, CPI based (annual %). And for export unit price ratios, we have used the
ratio of exports in current and constant USD.
a The comparable ﬁgure for OECD, China and India are 22, 24 and 4.7%, respectively.
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suppliers to the continent. This result, combined with the huge trade logistic and intra-Africa
infrastructure problems noted, further shows the challenge of exploiting the theoretically significant
trade potential suggested by the gravity model.
In addition to the RCAI shown above, Table 6 shows other related indicators of competitiveness
between potential African suppliers and the current export suppliers to the continent. Consumer price
index (CPI) ratio, as an indicator of general level of prices, is widely used in the literature for this
purpose. In all African countries identified as potential suppliers, their domestic price is found to be
larger than the domestic price of the current trading partners of Africa. The African based potential
suppliers do not also seem to fare better either in the relative level of their real effective exchange rate,
or export unit price and the composition of their exports (Table 6). This further shows how
challenging the realization of the untapped potential trade of the continent is.
In sum, the analysis in this section shows that given the geographic proximity, economic size and
cultural affinity African countries have a large potential for intra-Africa trade as we have shown in
Section 2 of this study. However, its realization is challenged by the lack of diversification and low
competitive position of potential African-based export suppliers which is making the short run
potential of intra-Africa trade very modest at best. These are, thus, challenges of intra-Africa trade and
regional integration that need to be examined. Understanding these challenges in turn requires
understanding factors behind export supply constraint, low level of competitiveness as well as the
record of poor diversification in the continent. The next section is devoted to that issue.
3. Major challenges of intra-Africa trade
The message from the analysis in the previous sections is: despite the theoretical significant
potential for intra-Africa trade, its performance to date is modest. This is attributed to the lack of
diversification and competitiveness. The latter, in turn, being determined by supply side constraints of
the African export sector. This section will focus on highlighting the major factors behind these
constraints. In Section 3.1 the major constraints to intra-Africa trade are examined at a general level.
These challenges could be categorized as:
a) The nature of African economies and lack of progress in regional integration
b) Absence or poor state of trade related infrastructure (trade logistics included)
c) Macro policy related problems such as lack of macroeconomic coordination including the
multiplicity and inconvertibility of currencies
d) Other supply side problems (trade facilitation): export promotion, inefficient customs
administration, international payment mechanism and related trade facilities.
This section attempts to address these issues using findings from available studies and an estimated
gravity model for all African countries. This will be followed by Section 3.2 that attempts to
concretize the result obtained in Section 3.1 using primary information from country case studies
about export supply constraint in Africa. The latter is based on research conducted by the African
Economic Research Consortium (AERC) on seven countries.
3.1. Export supply constraints
Despite the existence of significant potential for internal trade as well as positive suggestions from
trade similarity indices, actual internal trade in Africa is significantly below its potential. This is
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Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006).
3.1.1. The nature of African economies and lack of progress in regional economic integration
The sizes of most African markets are small which entails high transaction cost in trading and the
absence of benefits from economies of scale (Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006). These countries cannot
generate adequate quantity and quality of competitive exports or attract significant amounts of foreign
investment. Thus, active and conscious engagement on the global economy could help such African
countries to overcome the small internal market constraints (Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006). However,
exporting at world prices is challenging for many African countries as trade could still be costly even
if one can source inputs from an efficient global supplier (Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006). This is owing to
small consignment size, small-scale infrastructure and lack of competition (Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006).
This is aggravated by severe competition from other relatively developed countries and emerging
economies such as China and India (Geda, 2013). This is a challenge to most African countries. One
policy direction to address this problem is to pursue regional integration vigorously. This is becoming
difficult owing to the limiting structure of African production and trade as we have seen in the
previous sections.
The relatively small weight of intra-regional trade in Africa, despite the existence of several (and
frequently overlapping) RECs, is due largely to their structure of production and the composition of
their exports. Many countries are still specialized in a small number of primary commodities (i.e.;
there is lack of diversification) for their exports and most of their imports consist of manufacture
goods (UNCTAD, 2007; Limão and Venables, 2000). For instance, the relatively low level of
intra-regional trade in ECOWAS, according to Shams (2003), is explained by the high dependence of
most member countries on exports of primary commodities, and by a trade liberalization scheme that
has very strict rules of origin. Access to the regional market is especially difficult for those firms and
sectors that are at an early stage of development. Such firms have to rely on imported inputs, and the
content of domestic value added in their products is often too small to satisfy the rules of origin
requirement. In early 2000, only 17 manufacturing firms in the region were able to comply with these
rules (Shams, 2003).
Although it is difficult to establish whether intra-Africa trade causes progress in RECs or the other
way around, the two could be re-enforcing each other to bring progress in economic integration in the
region. Progress in regional integration, which would have been an invaluable instrument to expand
intra-Africa trade is limited mainly due to unwillingness of governments to (i) surrender some
sovereignty of macroeconomic policy making power to a regional authority; (ii) face potential
consumption costs that may arise by importing from a high-cost member country; (iii) accept unequal
distribution of gains and losses that may follow an integration agreement at least in the short run and
(iv) unwillingness to discontinue existing economic ties with non-members (Johnson, 1995; Geda and
Kibret, 2008).
3.1.2. Absence (or poor state) of trade related infrastructure
In many cases, formal trade liberalization is not successful partly because some fundamental
aspects of trade logistics, such as infrastructure are limited. According to Longo and Sekkat (2001) a
1% increase in the stock of transportation and telecommunication infrastructure in the exporting
country boosts its export towards other African countries by about 3%. Poor infrastructure, or its
complete absence, makes trade physically difficult, quite independent of the trade regime. The
performance of African countries with the potential to supply exports to the rest of the continent in
terms of trade related macro indicators is less remarkable compared to their current competitors such
Table 7
Trade related macroeconomic and infrastructure indicators for selected African countries in (2005–2013 average).
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, accessed April, 2015.
Macro-economic indicators Infrastructure indicators
CAB (%
GDP)
GDP growth
(annual %)
REER in 2013
(2010 = 100)
Telephone subs per
100 people
Quality of port
infrastructure
Internet users (per
100 people)
Algeria 12.32 3.01 103.26 8.08 2.98 11.37
Cameroon −2.34 3.46 99.54 2.05 3.19 3.89
Egypt −0.57 4.61 98.66 b 12.86 4.00 27.88
Kenya −5.02 5.28 106.4 b 0.98 3.73 16.71
Nigeria 13.48 6.01 118.82 0.72 3.06 19.44
South
Africa
−4.52 3.17 82.73 9.4 4.62 21.05
OECD 2.3 a 1.35 na 43.83 5.15 65.15
Sub-S.
Africa
na 4.77 na 1.44 3.71 8.52
Note: Quality of port infrastructure index varies between 1 and 7 (1 = extremely underdeveloped to 7 = well developed and
efficient by international standards).
a The average for 19 European area OECD countries; the value for USA is −2.3%.
b 2012 = 100 for Kenya. For Egypt 2010/11 = 100; however it appreciated by 18% in 2014 (IMF webpage, accessed April,
2015).
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efficiency of infrastructure relevant for trading in African-based potential export suppliers is well
below the level available in countries that are currently supplying exports to the African continent
such as the OECD member countries. Such deficiencies have also tended to isolate African states
from each other and thwarted the potential intra-Africa trade. Intra-Africa trade is further constrained
by the absence of market information. In Africa where communication links among countries are few
and indirect, relevant market information may be costly to obtain for both importers and exporters
(Yeboah, 1993).
The existence of tariff barriers or quantitative constraints also poses formidable obstacles to trade,
but they do not render trade exchanges completely impossible, as does the absence of an appropriate
regional infrastructure (UNCTAD, 2007). According to the ECA (2004) study, transport costs are
63% higher in African countries compared to the average in developed countries. Similarly, according
to UNCTAD (cited in Lisinge, 2005), the freight cost as a percentage of the imported value stood at
11% for North African countries. This is 111% more than those in industrialized countries and 25%
more compared to the average in developing countries. Collier and O'Connell (2008) noted that
globally coastal areas have a growth advantage of about 1.5% age points better compared with their
landlocked counterparts. As about 35% of African population lives in landlocked countries, compared
to the global average of 1%, this should have mattered a lot. However, neighborhood growth
spillovers are much weaker, and indeed for Africa's landlocked, resource-poor countries there are no
significant neighborhood growth spillovers in Collier and O'Connell's study. They have attributed
this to Africa's internal barriers to trade which is consistent with evidence on both the actual practice
of trade policies and the very high level of transport costs.
Trade logistics, level of economic development and the size of the economy, for instance, is found
to influence the bilateral trade potential in Southern African countries (Cassim, 2001). The study
shows that transaction costs of trade, the growth paths of economies and changes in per-capita income
should be the focus of economic policy in order to reap benefits from intra-Africa trade in the region.
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(Cassim, 2001). Similarly Shams (2003) noted that some of the major obstacles to intra-regional trade
in West Africa are bureaucratic and physical ones, such as road charges, transit fees and
administrative delays at borders and ports (Shams, 2003). Using a modified gravity model, Nwabuzor
(2002) found that trade growth among ECOWAS member nations has been thwarted by inadequate
infrastructure that tended to increase transaction costs. There is also supporting evidence on this in the
case studies discussed in Section 3.2 below.
In sum transport costs in Africa are found to be the highest in the world. The freight costs as
percentage of total value of import were about 13% for the continent in 2000 while it was 8.8% for all
developing countries and 5.2% for developed countries (UNCTAD, 2002). Ackah and Morrissey
(2005) also noted that transport cost constitutes about 15% (this being about 20% for landlocked
countries) of unit value of exports in Africa, which is considerably higher than other regions such as
Asia, about 8% and Western Europe about 5%. The freight cost differs from region to region in
Africa, however, with East and South Africa experiencing higher costs compared to other regions in
the continent. This poor infrastructure has increased the trading costs and lowered competitiveness
and, hence, contributed to the lower level of intra-Africa trade.3.1.3. Lack of macroeconomic coordination and the multiplicity and inconvertibility of currencies
Macroeconomic coordination is important for enhancing intra-Africa trade and regional
integration. This is because, as noted by O'Connell (1997), success on trade liberalization and
growth could be undercut by problems of macro policy coordination. Since the early 2000 the
continent as a whole has recorded one of the fastest economic growths in the world which was
interrupted shortly in 2008–09 due to the global economic crisis. However other indicators of macro
stability such as current account balance, exchange rate, and budget deficit were not that remarkable
(Table 7). There is also variation across countries in meeting regionally agreed macroeconomic
targets of convergence drawn for various RECs. This requires, among other things, building
institutions with a mandate to realize macro-economic policy harmonization in each REC.
Establishing such institutions that have a surveillance mechanism to enforce and monitor the
convergence criteria drawn is a daunting task. It requires submission of a certain degree of autonomy
in domestic policy making by member countries, establishing an elaborated and transparent
institutional mechanism, and deploying skilled personnel as the history of European integrations
shows. Studies on the issue show that there is an enormous variation across RECs in terms of their
macroeconomic posture, asymmetry of shocks as well as the policy response to such shocks (Geda,
2001; Weeks, 2008; Geda and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2014). This underscores the need to design a macro
policy harmonization scheme that suits the specific context of each REC with adequate safeguard
measure for weaker members. This needs to be accompanied by building institutions for its
implementation and a firm commitment by member countries.
A closely related macro policy harmonization agenda is the issue of currency. Establishment of
monetary unions in Africa can play a vital role in promoting intra-Africa trade. It is estimated, for
instance, that a pair of countries that start to use a common currency may see a near doubling of their
bilateral trade. Thus, the effect of currency union on trade is positive, significant and large (Rose,
2000; Rose and Engel, 2002; cited in Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006). The drastic fall in trade following the
issuing of separate currencies between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and North and South Sudan is a proof of
this by negation (Geda and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2014). The multiplicity of currencies compounded by
exchange rate problems encourages underground trade in the form of smuggling, and an expanding
unrecorded trade (Yeboah, 1993). Multiplicity of currencies do also raise international trade costs as
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uncertainties associated with the market for these currencies.
CEMAC and UEMOA are monetary unions, with CFA franc as the common currency. Although
formally differentiated, the common currencies are exchangeable between the two communities one
to one and are convertible into the euro at a fixed exchange rate. Southern Africa, Namibia and
Swaziland are members of a Common Monetary Area, where the South African rand circulates freely
as a common currency under a floating arrangement (Mutasa, 2003). In EAC, all three founding
members (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) have floating currencies. Most of the non-UEMOA
members of ECOWAS also have floating exchange rates. Although these are encouraging trends, the
multiplicity of currencies and exchange rate arrangements (including uncertainties associated with
them) that exist in Africa makes a case for the establishment of clearing mechanisms in the short run
and some kind of monetary union in the long run. ECOWAS and COMESA have formally
established clearing houses to promote intra-community trade with the use of local currencies against
a background of exchange control dictated by the scarcity of hard currencies in most countries
(Masson and Pattillo, 2001). Thus it is high time to build on this fragmented and less organized, yet
important initiatives and create an enabling macroeconomic environment for intra-Africa trade.
3.1.4. Other supply side challenges: trade facilitation policy measures
Trade and industrial policy making in newly developed Asian countries featured prominently in
their impressive growth record of the last five decades. Supply side measures that include export
promotion policies, appropriate and timely incentive structure as well as efficient bureaucracy at the
service of exporters are central for their trade growth. Failure to enhance trade facilitation measures
hinders trade by reducing market access through delays and higher costs; it also raises input costs
eroding the competitiveness of exporting firms (Biggs, 2007; Geda, 2012).
Customs authorities in many African countries are inefficient. Overall delays at African customs
are on average longer than the rest of the world: 12 days in countries south of the Sahara, compared to
7 days in Latin America, 5.5 days in Central and East Asia, and slightly more than 4 days in Central
and East Europe (ECA, 2004). Such delay increases the transaction cost of trading between African
countries. Generally, each day lost in transport delays due to customs and related problems is
equivalent to a tax of about 0.5% (World Bank, 2005). For example, in Southern Africa delays at the
main border crossing between South Africa and Zimbabwe (Beit-Bridge) amounted to six days in
February 2003, leading to an estimated loss in earnings per vehicle of US$1750, which is equivalent
to the cost of a shipment from Durban in South Africa to US (World Bank, 2005). Another study
(Alvis 2004, cited in World Bank, 2005) indicated that crossing a border in Africa can be equivalent
to the cost of more than 1000 miles of inland transportation compared to its equivalent of 100 miles in
Western Europe. Border crossing delays are also linked to other trade costs as well, especially
corruption in customs.
Related trade facilitation challenges include problems with international payment mechanisms,
insurance requirements, and customs guarantees. Documentary credit payment which is common in
many African countries is characterized by cumbersome and complex procedures. The process is time
consuming and is not well understood and badly managed by many users. Indeed it has been reported
that half of all requests for payment are rejected on grounds of documentary inconsistencies (Njinkeu
and Fosso, 2006; Mutasa, 2003). In addition, delays and complicated procedures related to insurance
of goods and customs guarantee requirements are believed to raise the cost of exports from Africa and
reduce its firms' competitiveness. It is estimated that each day of delay reduces export earnings by
about 1%. With this rate, if Uganda, for instance, reduces its factory-to-ship time from the current
level of 58 days to 27 days, its exports would have increased by 30% (Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006).
Table 8
Some indicators trade related competitiveness for selected African countries in 2013.
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2013.
Angola Botswana Egypt Ethiopia Mauritius Rwanda South
Africa
Cost of starting a business (% of income per capita) 143.10 1.10 10.40 135.30 3.30 21.60 0.30
Paid-in min. capital (% of income per capita) 24.60 na na 249.10 na na na
Total tax rate (% profit) 52.1 25.4 43.2 32.5 27.5 35. 32.
Cost to export (US$ per container) 2050 2945 625 2180 660 3245 1620
Cost to import (US$ per container) 2715 3445 755 2660 695 4990 1940
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doing business that includes delays in customs clearing, business regulatory environment and related
macroeconomic management, where African countries hardly register good ratings.
To give a continent wide quantifiable dimension of the issues briefly outlined in this section
(infrastructure, trade related policies, the ease of ‘doing business’ and the role of regional economic
communities), a gravity model of determinants of African trade is specified and estimated using the
PPML method (see Appendix A for model specification). The result is reported in Table 9. The modelTable 9
Gravity model: All African countries, 1993–2010.
Estimation technique: PPML
Variables Xijt (coeff.) Strd error
Ln(GDP)-exporter 1.807 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.0254)
Ln(GDP)-importer 0.214 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.0243)
Landlocked-importer dummy −1.382 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.172)
Landlocked-exporter dummy −0.577 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.153)
Share border dummy. 1.615 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.252)
Common language. dummy 0.134 (0.139)
Common colonizer dummy 1.033 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.139)
Ln(distance in km) −1.300 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.131)
IGAD 0.33 (0.582)
COMESA −0.143 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.0165)
SADC 0.324 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.0298)
ECOWAS 2.003 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.224)
Ln(per capita GDP difference) −0.00066 (0.00297)
Ln(area in km2)-importer −0.476 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.041)
Ln(area in km2)-exporter −0.253 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.0454)
Bilateral exchange rate 0.0577 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.00562)
Ln(population size)-exporter −0.0623 (0.0464)
Ln(population size)-importer 0.986 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.0441)
Ln(remoteness)-importer 0.409 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.0118)
Ln(remoteness)-exporter 0.323 ⁎⁎⁎ (0.0124)
Constant −42.39 ⁎⁎⁎ −1.265
Number of observations
Note: Ln refers to natural logarithm; IGAD, COMESA, SADC and ECOWAS refer to the RECs where most African countries
belong and a dummy variable is used to incorporate them.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01. ⁎⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎ p b 0.1.
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countries using data from 1993–2010. In addition to traditional gravity model variables, indicators of
membership to African RECs were also included as additional regressors in this model.
Table 9 shows that all traditional gravity model variables are found to be important determinants of
African trade. Among these, distance from trading partners (a proxy for cost of international
transport), the income of trading partners, sharing border, and landlockedness, in the order of
importance, are found to be the most important determinants of African trade. In addition, the
remoteness index which captures multilateral trade resistance term has the expected positive impact
on bilateral trade among African countries. Bilateral real effective exchange rate is found to be
another important determinant of bilateral trade. It has a positive coefficient suggesting that
depreciation of home country's currency makes this home country competitive and increases bilateral
trade. Membership in RECs seems generally to enhance trade.4
To sum up, this section has shown that even if African countries have the potential to trade, the
export supply constraint will act as a major hindrance to realize that potential. The quantifiable
dimension of these issues is also summarized using a general gravity model estimated for Africa as a
whole. The result confirms not only the importance of RECs to enhance African trade but also the
importance of the challenges of exporting (infrastructure and competitiveness) in determining the
level of African trade. Thus, progress in intra-Africa trade and regional integration requires addressing
these major challenges. To substantiate the aggregate level finding in this section, recent country case
study based evidence on the issue is examined in the next sub-section.
3.2. Evidence from county case studies on export supply constraint in Africa
Country level in-depth study about export supply constraints in Africa is absent from the literature.
The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) has, however, conducted an in-depth study on
the issue on a sample of countries. A summary of the major findings of these studies are briefly
offered below (See Table 10.). This country based evidence does corroborate the overall picture given
by our models in this study.
The AERC case studies are geographically representative of the continent. The studies attempted
to examine the supply constraints of both traditional and non-traditional exports from macro (using
macro data), micro (using firm level sample survey) as well as process (using value-chain analysis)
perspectives. These are combined with market access condition to determine the level of actual
African exports, as depicted in Diagram 2. Although different factors are found to have different
degrees of importance across countries, some commonality could be read from country case studies.
This can be inferred from the brief description of each covered country below and a summary table
(Table 10).
Beginning with Sudan, real exchange rate, high input costs, old and outdated equipment, high cost
of energy, and high port charges are found to be the most binding constraints of traditional exports
from Sudan. Export of oil is a non-traditional export of Sudan which is increasingly dominating the
export sector (Maglad et al., 2009). One noticeable phenomenon in this connection is a decline in the
traditional exports of Sudan that is accompanying the surge in oil exports — indicating a possibility
of the so called ‘Dutch Disease’ effect and the failure of Sudan to carry out a proper macroeconomic
management.4 The only exception is the statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient for COMESA. This seems an implausible result which
is difﬁcult to explain and perhaps related to the condition that this REC has members with highest multiple membership that
hampers trade (see Diagram 1). The statistically insigniﬁcant result for IGAD seems a sensible result, given the low level of
trade among members of this REC.
Table 10
Summary of major supply side constraints of African exports.
Source: Author's compilation based on AERC Export Supply Constraint Studies of 2009.
Country Traditional exports Non-traditional exports
Top major
constraint
2nd major
constraint
3rd major
constraint
Top major
constraint
2nd major
constraint
3rd major
constraint
Congo Exchange rate Investment Poor road Same Same Same
Cote d'Ivoire Exchange rate Investment Poor road Same Same Same
Ethiopia Exchange rate Income of
trading partners
Investment Poor road Power High cost
of inputs
Ghana Exchange rate Income of
trading partners
Macro &
trade policy
Competition in
foreign market
Demand
for exports
High cost
of inputs/skill
Kenya Exchange rate Income of
trading partners
Investment Poor road Power High cost
of inputs
Sudan Exchange rate High cost
of inputs
Old equipment Dutch diseases
Uganda Disease/pest Real exchange
rate
Finance Competition in
foreign market
Finance Tariff in
foreign market
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garment and furniture exporting sub-sector as well as in Ghana's traditional exports of cocoa,
minerals and timber. In the latter group of exports, macroeconomic factors such as real exchange rate
and the level and growth of Ghana's trading partners' income are found to be important determinants
of export growth. These exports are also found to be adversely affected by a combination of
expansionary macroeconomic policies and restrictive trade policies. Similarly, constraints imposed by
institutional and regulatory rules are estimated to impose costs equivalent to 4 to 20% of the fob value
of exports in Ghana. In the non-traditional export sector, in addition to non-conducive
macroeconomic environment, competition both from foreign and domestic firms, insufficientMacro Determinant
Micro Determinants
Process 
Determinants 
(value)
Market Access 
Determinants
Export Supply 
Capacity
Actual 
Exports
Diagram 2. The analytical structure of the AERC study.
Source: Based on AERC studies at www.Aercafrica.org.
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taxes and interest charges (finance), in their order of importance, are found to be the major constraints
to export supply. These supply side constraints are also found to be important both for exporting and
non-exporting firms in Ghana including the garment and furniture exporting firms chosen for the
study (Akouoni et al., 2009).
The Ghanaian and Kenyan studies have also shown that government could play a positive role in
exporting by creating the skilled labor necessary for exporting firms and by improving the general
enabling environment for exporting. In Ghana employable manpower was lacking at all levels of the
garment exporting industry a decade ago. This included managers, supervisors, technicians and
machinists. Ghana's government attempted to address this through setting up basic skills training
centers with the help of expatriate staff. Almost 80% of firms interviewed in Ghana's study were of
the view that the quality of workers on the market had improved and they are happy with it. They also
noted the problem of a large turnover of labor in the garment industry that necessitates having a pool
of skilled workers that firms can hire from.
Within the export sector, the results of the Ghanaian survey indicate that a high proportion of
garment firms (i.e. 70.4%) and about 50% of furniture firms indicated that they had adequate access to
technology. This is a direct result of efforts that have been put in place in Ghana under the
government's program of special ‘Initiative on Garments and Textiles’. This is aimed at providing
support towards the acquisition of appropriate technology aimed at helping local garment
manufacturers to take advantage of the enormous opportunities offered under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Akouoni et al., 2009). Similarly, the Kenyan government helped the
growth of its non-traditional export sector (horticulture) through the Horticultural Crops Development
Authority's (HCDA). HCDA aims to promote and develop production and marketing of horticultural
potential exporters. It oversees the signing and implementation of contract between farmers and
exporters and has therefore played an important role in the marketing and export of horticultural
produce from small holder farmers— hence the unprecedented growth of this export sector in Kenya
(Onjala and Otieno, 2009). Similar initiative for horticulture development has also been done by
Ethiopia that saw significant growth during the initial years. The lesson from the Ghanaian and
Kenyan studies is that the skill supply by the government was central to deal with supply side
constraints of exporting firms (Akouoni et al., 2009; Onjala and Otieno, 2009).
In Ethiopia's and Kenya's export supply studies both traditional (coffee, tea, livestock and
livestock products) and non-traditional exports (horticulture, including cut flowers) are investigated.
The result shows that at the macro level, the demand for African exports (depicted by the level and
growth of the income of Ethiopia's and Kenya's trading partners), appropriate real exchange rate and
domestic capacity are found to be important in determining both traditional and non-traditional
exports. For non-traditional exports, the evidence at firm level indicate that poor road network, high
cost of electricity (in Kenya) and high cost of imported inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides (both in
Kenya and Ethiopia) are found as major constraints of export supply. In the traditional exports of both
countries, low quality of inputs such as hides and skins, competition from other exporters, access to
finance as well as the power of middle men/brokers are found to be important constraints on the
supply of exports (Geda et al., 2009; Onjala and Otieno, 2009).
The Ugandan study shows that at the macro level, export supply in Uganda is constrained by the
level of investment, capacity utilization rate and real exchange rate. At firm level productivity and
access to modern technology, high cost of inputs (both raw material and labor), high taxes and license
fees, lack of finance, inconsistency in government policy, lack of marketing information and
corruption, in the order of importance, are found to be the major constraints of exporting both
traditional and non-traditional exports. The major constraints in the non-tradition exports (fish and
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market, lack of finance, high tariff and access to information in foreign market as well as access to and
cost of imported inputs. For traditional exports (such as coffee) pests and related coffee disease, low
price of coffee, lack of finance and poor infrastructure, in the order of importance, are found to be the
major constraints to export supply (see Mwebaze et al., 2009). Finally, although the result is based on
preliminary work, export supply in Cote d'Ivoire and Congo are found to be constrained by real
exchange rate at the macro level, as well as level of investment and domestic GDP used as an
indicator of domestic production capacity. In addition to these factors, export supply in Congo (which
is oil and timber) is also found to be constrained by poor road and shortage and high cost of power
(Seka et al., 2009; Samba et al., 2009).
In sum, as can be read from Table 10 that summarizes the information above, the traditional
exports in the case study countries may grow and prosper through appropriate macro policy, in
particular exchange rate policy, followed by enhancing investment and infrastructure, especially
roads. Similarly, the non-traditional export growth may be achieved, in addition to having appropriate
macro and trade policies, through improvement in infrastructure (such as road), availability of skilled
labor force and reliable supply of inputs at reasonable price that could raise the relative competitive
position of exporting firms.
4. Conclusion and policy implications
In this study an attempt to examine the potential for intra-Africa trade as well as the prospects of
advancing regional economic integration through trade is made. A variety of methods are deployed
for the purpose. The analysis shows that although the result from a gravity model based simulation
exercise suggests the existence of a great potential for intra-Africa trade, realizing this potential and
hence the effort to advance regional integration through intra-Africa trade is challenged by the lack of
complementarity of exports and imports as well as the relative competitive position of potential
African suppliers. This is the result of weak infrastructure, weak productivity and weak trade
facilitation — in short acute supply constraint that characterized the African exports.
This calls for an innovative approach for enhancing intra-Africa trade and furthering regional
integration. Such an approach needs to focus on addressing the challenges of export supply constraint,
competitiveness of African exports as well as their diversification. The policy direction in this regard
is to go beyond liberalization to actual creation of the potential for trade through provision of
infrastructure, harmonizing macroeconomic policies, setting up conducive institutions, as well as
developing trade facilitation and diversification plan at continental and regional levels. The existing
RECs and bilateral economic arrangements could be used as vehicles for this purpose. This effort may
be problematic, however, as most African countries do find themselves at different levels of
development and with limited resources.
Variable geometry which allows some groups to move faster than the others could be usefully
employed to address this latter problem (Oyejide, 2000; Alemayehu and Haile, 2008). This may take
a new cooperation framework where responsibilities may be allocated across regions and countries to
address the major constraints of intra-Africa trade and advance regional integration — physical
infrastructure and production capacity — which will enhance the competitiveness of countries in
Africa (Oyejide, 2000) and raise supply. Thus, investing in physical infrastructure across African
countries, including multi-country infrastructure that could be carried by RECs, is an important policy
direction for national, regional and continental organizations.
In addition, as regulation, doing business and trade facilitation are found in many countries as
major constraints to intra-Africa trade, RECs may need to be directed at addressing these challenges.
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need to facilitate efficient service in core-infrastructure-related services such as finance,
telecommunication, energy and transportation (Njinkeu and Fosso, 2006).
Both advances in regional integration and intra-Africa trade growth are conditional on other
important policies to be carried out by individual or group of countries. Rodrik (2006, cited in Biggs,
2007) for instance noted that Bangladesh's relative factor endowments are similar to that of China—
abundant labor and scarce human and physical capital. But China has an export bundle that is 50%
more sophisticated than Bangladesh, a difference that must have a lot to do with policy. China has
made a determined effort to transfer technology into the country and to diversify exports and
Bangladesh has not. China, Vietnam and India have successfully integrated their economies into the
world market not through open liberalization but by identifying and promoting exports and
diversification that best suited their initial condition, political economy and institutional constraint
(Biggs, 2007). Similarly, Africa's policy towards regional integration and intra-Africa trade need not
be one-fits-all policy prescription. It should be tailor made to suit both different regions and individual
countries. Such policy also needs to take diversification as a central issue as export or import
similarity is one of the major hindrances to intra-Africa trade and advances in regional integration. As
the recent UNCTAD (2013) study on the issue and our empirical findings in this study show,
intra-Africa trade presents opportunities for sustained growth and development in Africa. However,
exploiting this opportunity requires private sector development, a development-based approach to
regional integration, building export supply capacity and regional value chains, implementing
existing regional trade agreements and maintaining peace and security (UNCTAD, 2013), which are
in line with the findings of this study.
Finally, notwithstanding the proximate causes of lack of progress on regional integration and
further growth in intra-Africa trade such as lack of adequate liberalization, deeper determinants of
progress in regional integration and intra-Africa trade are related to issues of geography, incentives,
capability, infrastructure, institutions and initial conditions (Biggs, 2007). We have demonstrated the
importance of these factors in this study. A sustainable solution needs to address these deeper
problems in medium to long term. This needs to be carried in a phased and coordinated fashion at
national, regional and continental levels. It is high time that African governments move from simple
liberalization schemes to a regional ‘outline of the policy and institutional framework’ for actual
capacity creation aimed at enhancing intra-Africa trade and further progress on regional integration.
This needs to take a concrete form of addressing the challenge of diversification and export supply
constraints that limit competitiveness.
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Appendix A. The gravity model specification and estimation procedure
The gravity model has widely been used to identify determinants of bilateral trade, though it is
often criticized for lacking a strong theoretical basis. As Cernat (2001) noted, despite its use in many
early studies of international trade, the model was considered suspect in that it could not easily be
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terms of differential factor endowments. However, Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Deardorff
(1995), and Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (1998) have each developed the theoretical foundations to
formally derive the model and informed our modeling here. In a typical gravity model, bilateral trade
flows are determined by the size of the two economies and the distance between them. However, it is
always possible to expand the model to include other relevant determinants of trade. In line with this
tradition, the following standard gravity model is specified and estimated to examine the potential for
intra-Africa trade in this study:
Ti j ¼ aYβ1i Yβ2j Dβ3i j Nβ5J RTAβ6i j Aβ7i j REMβ8it REMβ9jt η i j
where: T is bilateral trade between country i and j; Y is GDP; N is population size, D is the bilateral
distance; A represents other relevant variables (cultural and geographic factors such as common
official language, sharing border, being landlocked, bilateral exchange rate between partner countries)
and RTA shows membership in regional groupings of COMESA, SADC, IGAD & ECOWAS. The
REM denotes remoteness index which captures multilateral trade resistance term. This variable
measures the average distance of country “i” from all trading countries. Hence the expected sign of
the coefficient is positive suggesting that more remote countries (owing to less resistance around them
to trade) trade more between each other; η is the stochastic term.
This model is estimated using bilateral export data of African countries. The censored nature of
such regional bilateral trade data implies that (the log-linearized) OLS estimates are biased. Thus, the
model is estimated using Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method to address the
problems associated with OLS (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). As alternative to PPML, a panel Tobit
technique is also employed. The parameters of the model are, thus, computed by finding the estimates
that maximize the likelihood function in these formulations. An experiment of other estimation
techniques such as fixed-effect and random-effect models did not change the overall result reported.
A.1. Data source
The trade data is taken from IMFs Direction of Trade Statistics; Macro indicators are taken from
the World Bank's World Development Indicators as well as from the African Development
Indicators. Remoteness index is the researchers' own computation. The relevant data for each African
country and its trading partner is compiled for the sample of countries listed below.
Sample of countries used in the gravity model by regional economic communities.COMESA ECOWAS SADC IGAD OthersBurundi Benin Angola Djibouti Algeria
Comoros Burkina Faso Congo, Dem. Rep. Ethiopia Tunisia
Congo, Dem. Rep. Cape Verde Madagascar Kenya Morocco
Djibouti Cote d'Ivoire Malawi Somalia Mauritania
Egypt Gambia, The Mauritius Sudan Cameron
Ethiopia Ghana Mozambique Uganda Central African Rep.
Kenya Guinea Seychelles Chad
Libya Guinea-Bissau South Africa Congo, Rep.
Madagascar Liberia Tanzania Gabon
Malawi Mali Zambia Equatorial Guinea
Mauritius Niger Zimbabwe São Tomé and Principe
Rwanda Nigeria(continued on next page)
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Sudan Sierra Leone
Uganda Togo
Zambia
ZimbabweAppendix B. Import–export similarity index computation
The import–export similarity index as proposed by Van Beers and Linneman (1988) has the
following two forms labeled Cosign (COS) and Export–import similarity (EIS) index. Taking i and j
for exporting and importing countries, respectively, these indices are given as:
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where Eik is the exports of country i in commodity class k; Mjk is the imports of country j in
commodity class k; and k is commodity class 1,…,n.
Both measures of import–export correspondence index, COS and EIS, vary between zero (no
correspondence between the export of country i and the import of country j) and one (perfect
similarity). COS is the cosine of the angle between the vectors of country i exports and the vector of
country j imports in an n-dimensional commodity space. The related equation EIS, given as Eq. (2), is
the sum over all commodity classes of the share of commodity class k in country i exports or in
country j imports— whichever of these two shares is the lower, so that only the ‘overlap’ counts (see
Van Beers and Linneman, 1988). The measures are sensitive to the level of aggregation; generally
increasing the number of commodity classes, n, will tend to lower the numerical value of the
measures. To avoid this problem, only the top five import and export commodities of all African
countries, for which data is available for the year 2007 from UNComtrade, are used. Owing to its
non-linear nature, the COS measure may assume a higher value, compared to EIS, when there is a
high concentration of tradable commodities [i.e. if one commodity has the lion's share, among the top
five exports of country A, and this is similar with one of the imports which also has the lion's share of
country B imports, then the COSAB will be high even if the other exports of country A are entirely
different from the imports of country B]. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, COS is normally
preferred in the literature and hence used in this study.
A measure of export–import similarity may be interpreted as a variable reflecting the expected
intensity of a bilateral trade flow from exporting country i to importing country j. The similarity of
exports and imports of all class of commodities is, however, one of the determinants of trade intensity
between two countries. The term ‘intensity’ is used in Van Beers and Linneman's (1988)
interpretation to indicate that the analysis abstracts from the economic size of trading partners are
reflected in the total volume or value of their exports and imports.
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lnREMO_R 0.9814 −0.014 0.0049 −0.1982 0.0317 −0.0385 −0.0298 0.0239 −0.0198 0.0636 −0.1432 0.2069 −0.0144
B_REERij 0.0923 −0.0293 0.0001 −0.0417 0.0154 −0.0407 −0.05 −0.0042 0.0116 0.0151 −0.032 0.0398 0.0507
ldistance 0.0687 0.0687 −0.0687 −0.0687 −0.5245 −0.0674 −0.0945 −0.1315 −0.1911 −0.0766 −0.5117 0.1777 −0.0659
lnarea_r lnREMO_P lnREMO_R B_REERij ldistance
lnarea_r 1.0000
lnREMO_P −0.0144 1
lnREMO_R 0.5982 −0.0167 1
B_REERij 0.0299 −0.0456 0.1093 1
ldistance −0.0659 0.0985 0.0985 0.0078 1
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